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THE ROBERT L. LEVINE                               
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE 
THE DECIDERS:  THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY 
AND FREE SPEECH IN THE AGE OF FACEBOOK 
AND GOOGLE 
Jeffrey Rosen*
 
 
I would like to begin with a hypothetical, which in a few years may not 
be a hypothetical after all.  I was at a conference at Google in 2007 and 
Andrew McLaughlin, then the head of public policy, said he expected that 
before long, Google will be asked to post online live feeds to all the public 
and private surveillance cameras in the world.  If the feeds were linked and 
archived, then it would be possible to click on an image of anyone in the 
world and ubiquitously track their movements forward and backward in 
time, 24/7, for months or years. 
A ubiquitous surveillance system like this is hardly implausible:  it is 
easy to imagine public and governmental demand for it over the next few 
years, due to a combination of interest in social networking, voyeurism, and 
demand from national security agencies that insist that a linked camera 
system is necessary to protect us against terrorism. 
If Google succumbed to the strong public demand and implemented an 
open-circuit television system, would it violate the Constitution?  You 
might say that surveillance on Google poses no constitutional issues at all.  
According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment, which protects us 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the First Amendment, 
which protects free speech, only regulate the state, and Google is a private 
corporation.  
But maybe the state-action problem is not so simple.  If the government 
used Open Planet to track citizens for national security purposes and the 
platform integrated both publicly and privately owned camera systems, then 
according to current doctrine, there might be enough of a hook to create a 
kind of state action and some sort of Fourth or First Amendment issue. 
 
*  Jeffrey Rosen is a professor of law at George Washington Law School.  He is also legal 
affairs editor of The New Republic and a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings 
Institution. He is a co-editor, most recently, of CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (2011).  His remarks, delivered on February 8, 2011, have been 
lightly edited and augmented in light of recent developments. 
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Let us imagine that the Supreme Court holds that police surveillance of 
random citizens on Google is, in fact, a search regulated by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Would the Court require a warrant before the government can 
track someone’s movements on Google for a month?  This is precisely the 
issue raised by United States v. Jones,1 the most important privacy case of 
the decade, which the Court recently decided.  The question in that case was 
whether the police, without a valid warrant, could surreptitiously place a 
Global Positioning System (GPS) device on the bottom of someone’s car 
and monitor his or her movements, 24/7, for a month.2
The Court had the discretion, within the contours of existing doctrine, to 
rule any way it liked.  On the one hand, the Court could have agreed with 
the Obama Administration, which came close to arguing in Jones that we 
have no expectation of privacy in public places.  Three federal circuit courts 
took a similar position, and upheld the use of GPS tracking devices to 
monitor a person’s movement in a car, holding simplistically that such 
tracking is not a search because we have no expectation of privacy in our 
public movements.
 
3
But this seems counterintuitive.  Is it really possible that 24/7 
surveillance of the public raises no Fourth Amendment issues?  At the time 
of the framing of the Constitution, a far smaller invasion was held to be the 
paradigmatic example of a Fourth Amendment search—namely, the 
decision by King George’s henchmen to break into the houses of colonists 
in search of the author of a seditious pamphlet.
  Because any of our neighbors or any member of the 
public could put a tail on us without implicating our Fourth Amendment 
protections, these courts have held, then virtual cameras can put a dragnet 
tail on us and survey all of our movements. 
4
Justice Louis Brandeis, when evaluating the constitutionality of 
wiretapping, recognized that the invasion committed by listening in on a 
telephone conversation was so much greater in degree than even the general 
warrants that the framers feared.  The Constitution had to be understood to 
take account of this new technology, he insisted, or else citizens would have 
less privacy in the age of the wires than they did at the time of the framing.
  That inspired the Fourth 
Amendment principle that our “persons, houses, papers, and effects” that 
our personal papers should be immune from general fishing expeditions.  
The search of private desk drawers was a dramatic invasion of privacy, but 
surely the possibility of being tracked 24/7 from door to door is an even 
greater invasion. 
5
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 
Brandeis’s challenge becomes even more urgent when we are faced with 
 2. Id. 
 3. See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Pineda-Moreno, 571 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 10-
7515, 2012 WL 538278 (Feb. 21, 2012); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997–98 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
 4. See generally Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). 
 5. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
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the possibility of ubiquitous surveillance of our public movements in cars or 
on Google.  
In Jones, the majority opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia emphasized that 
the GPS surveillance was a search because the police had to trespass on 
Jones’s property interests when they attached the GPS device to his car.  In 
a path-breaking concurring opinion, Justice Samuel Alito emphasized that 
there is a difference between long-term virtual surveillance, which requires 
a warrant, and short-term surveillance, which does not.  Alito seems to have 
been influenced by the visionary opinion of Judge Douglas Ginsburg, the 
D.C. federal court judge who ruled in Jones that the warrantless GPS 
surveillance was unconstitutional.  Ginsburg properly rejected the 
implausible analogy between GPS surveillance and surveillance by 
neighbors by noting, “the likelihood anyone will observe” all of your 
movements over the course of a month is “effectively nil.”6  Ginsburg also 
emphasized that “prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not 
revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, 
what he does not do, and what he does ensemble.”7
Let us now imagine that we are in the year 2025.  It is possible that the 
Court might be more ambitious, striking down 24/7 Google surveillance not 
only as an unreasonable search but also as a violation of the right to 
personal autonomy recognized in cases like Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
 
8 and Lawrence v. Texas.9  We think of 
the right-to-privacy cases, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut,10 and 
culminating in Roe v. Wade11 and Lawrence, as cases about sexual 
autonomy.  But in Lawrence and Casey, Justice Anthony Kennedy, the 
most enthusiastic proponent of expansive autonomy reasoning, recognized a 
far more sweeping principle of personal autonomy that might well protect 
individuals from totalizing forms of ubiquitous surveillance.  As Kennedy 
wrote in Lawrence, “[F]reedom extends beyond spatial bounds.  Liberty 
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct.”12
Kennedy’s vision of an autonomy of self that depends on preventing the 
state from becoming a dominant presence in public, as well as private, 
places has been invoked recently to call into question not only ubiquitous 
surveillance but also the constitutionality of health care reform.  As framed 
by libertarian strategists, the health care lawsuits purport to be about 
federalism—that is, the proper balance between state and federal power. 
 
Libertarians believe that neither the states nor the federal government 
should be able to force people to buy things they do not want to buy—
 
 6. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 9545. 
 7. Id. at 562. 
 8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 9. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 12. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
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whether broccoli or Chevy Impalas or health care.  But in pressing the 
broccoli objection,13
invites the government to force me to buy everything from exercise 
machines to bicycles, because there is always some good that the coercive 
use of state authority can advance.  The ironic point is that this is not a 
commerce clause argument as such, for in my view any state statute 
would be subject to the same objection.
 libertarians are not really objecting that the health care 
mandate represents a federal intrusion on states’ rights; instead, they are 
making an argument about individual liberty.  Unlike Randy Barnett, for 
example, Richard Epstein has argued candidly that the health care mandate 
violates a sweeping libertarian right of freedom of contract that constrains 
not only Congress but the states as well.  To uphold the mandate, he wrote,  
14
There is, in fact, a line of Supreme Court cases that says that neither the 
states nor the federal government should be able to interfere with the 
“freedom of contract” or force people to engage in unwanted economic 
transactions.  They are associated with Lochner v. New York,
 
15 which struck 
down a New York law setting maximum hours for bakers on the grounds 
that individuals should be able to arrange their economic affairs without 
becoming “wards of the State.”16
As a logical matter, it is possible to imagine a libertarian Justice like 
Anthony Kennedy striking down the health care mandate, warrantless GPS 
tracking, and even warrantless FBI surveillance on Open Planet in the name 
of the right to personal autonomy recognized in Roe, Casey, and Lawrence.  
Given his fervent beliefs about the need to protect the relationship between 
parents and children, as well as individual autonomy to make major life 
decisions, it is not hard to imagine him being sympathetic to the claim that 
the health care mandate violates the right of individuals to make basic 
health care decisions for themselves and their families.  It is even possible 
to imagine Kennedy, in the same Supreme Court Term, voting to strike 
down the health care mandate and warrantless GPS tracking and to 
recognize a right to gay marriage, all on the same ground that the “liberty 
presumes an autonomy of self.”
  Conservative opponents of Roe v. Wade 
have denounced Lochner because they believe that resurrecting a right to 
freedom of contract would encourage judges to enforce other rights not 
listed in the text of the Constitution, such as the right to privacy recognized 
in Roe. 
17
 
 13. See Randy Barnett, If Obamacare’s Mandate Is Approved, Congress Can Require 
Anything, WASH. EXAMINER (June 6, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/
2011/06/if-obamacares-mandate-approved-congress-can-require-anything/40085.  
  But no other conservative Justice would 
join him:  John Roberts, Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence 
Thomas have all staked their judicial philosophies on the wrongness of 
 14. See Richard Epstein, Obamacare Is Now on the Ropes, RICOCHET (Dec. 13, 2011, 
12:01 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/ObamaCare-is-Now-on-the-Ropes. 
 15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 16. Id. at 57. 
 17. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
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Lochner and Roe.  “Who says Roe must say Lochner and Scott,” Robert 
Bork wrote in The Tempting of America.18
A reluctance to create an amorphous new right of personal autonomy, in 
other words, may have persuaded Justice Scalia and the conservative 
justices who joined him to rule narrowly in the Jones case, rather than 
joining Justice Alito’s broader prohibition on warrantless long term 
surveillance.  All this suggests that whether the Supreme Court in 2012 or 
2025 recognizes a right to privacy in public places narrowly or broadly 
depends less on the logic of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
arguments on behalf of privacy than on the composition of the Court and on 
public sentiment.  If the past is any guide, the Court’s answer will largely 
depend on whether the public views 24/7 ubiquitous surveillance as 
invasive and unreasonable, or whether citizens have become so used to 
ubiquitous surveillance on and off the Web, in virtual spaces and in real 
space, that the public demands 24/7 global camera feeds on Google rather 
than protesting against them. 
 
This is the broad thesis that I want to try to persuade you of this evening.  
In the age of Google and Facebook, technologies that thoughtfully balance 
privacy with free expression and other values can be imagined.  But they 
are only likely to be adopted when engaged minorities of citizens have 
protested against poorly designed architectures and demanded better ones, 
helping to create a social consensus that the invasive designs are 
unreasonable.  To persuade you of that thesis—that it is possible to design 
good technologies, but you need a social consensus to implement them—I 
want to offer three other examples:  first, the example of body-scanning 
machines at airports; second, the example of the internet that never forgets 
our drunken Facebook pictures; and third, the example of videos on 
YouTube that are being taken up and taken down, not on the order of 
courts, but on the order of Google executives, who exercise far more power 
over speech than does the Supreme Court.  
First, consider the body scanners that proliferated at airports around the 
world after 9/11.  As early as 2004, the U.S. government was confronted 
with a simple choice:  naked machines or blob machines.  The naked 
machines, as their name suggests, reveal not only contraband, metal, or 
plastics concealed under clothing, but also graphic images of the naked 
body.  By contrast, the blob machines offered a sexless avatar, complete 
with an arrow pointing to any suspicious areas.  From the perspective of 
privacy, the choice between the naked machines and the blob machine was, 
as they say, a no brainer:  both offered identical amounts of security, while 
the naked machine threatened privacy and the blob machine preserved it.  
For this reason, the handful of European airports that adopted body 
scanners after 9/11 demanded versions of the blob machine rather than the 
naked machine.  Most European airport authorities refused, after concluding 
 
 18. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 32 (1990). 
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that the machines were not effective in detecting low-density powders, such 
as those used by the 2009 Christmas trouser bomber.19
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security made a very different 
decision.  It deployed the naked body scanners without any opportunity for 
public comment, releasing privacy impact statements that refused to 
demand the blob machine.  Then the department appeared shocked—
shocked!—by the backlash that ensued. 
 
Remarkably, however, the backlash was effective.  After a nationwide 
protest inspired by someone who should be considered the Patrick Henry of 
the anti-naked machines movement—the traveler who memorably 
exclaimed, “Don’t touch my junk”20
A few months after authorizing the intrusive pat-downs, in February 
2011, the TSA announced that it would begin testing, on a pilot basis, 
versions of the very same blob machine that the agency had rejected nearly 
a decade earlier.
—President Obama called on the TSA 
to go back to the drawing board. 
21  It subsequently decided to install filtering software at 
the 41 airports that use millimeter wave technology, although the airports 
that use backscatter machines remain unfiltered for now.22
This is a case, in other words, where political protest had an effect.  Of 
course, it was not just political protest that created this relatively happy 
outcome, which can be described as one of modified rapture; the threat of 
lawsuits also helped.  The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), 
where I am proud to be on the advisory board, filed a lawsuit challenging 
the naked machines as unreasonable, and as unconstitutional.
   
23  I think 
there is a strong, although not decisive, argument under existing doctrine 
that EPIC should win.  A 1983 opinion by the Supreme Court, written by 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, approved the use of drug-sniffing dogs.24  
O’Connor writes that a search is most likely to be considered 
constitutionally reasonable if it is very effective in discovering contraband 
without revealing any innocent but embarrassing information.25
 
 19. See Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Says Plane Passenger Tried to Detonate 
Device, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at A1. 
  So a dog 
sniff is perfect in that regard.  In that sense, the backscatter machines—the 
naked machines—are the antithesis of a perfect or reasonable search.  They 
reveal a great deal of innocent but embarrassing information and are 
remarkably ineffective at revealing low-density contraband. 
 20. See generally Catherine Saillant, Traveler who Resisted TSA Pat-Down Is Glad His 
Moment of Fame Is Nearly Over, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/
2010/nov/19/local/la-me-screening-tyner-20101119. 
 21. See Ashley Halsey III, TSA Debuts System for More Modest Scans, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 2, 2011, at A2. 
 22. See Ashley Halsey III, TSA to Roll Out Less Revealing Scanner, BOSTON.COM (July 
21, 2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-07-21/business/29798553_1_scanners-john-s-
pistole-tsa-administrator. 
 23. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 09-2084 (D.D.C. filed 
Jan. 12, 2011). 
 24. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 25. Id. at 707. 
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Although the Supreme Court has not evaluated airport screening 
technology, lower courts have insisted that particular screening searches are 
reasonable if they are no more extensive or intrusive than necessary, in light 
of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives.  
Then-Judge Alito, in 2006, reiterated that screening technology has to be 
effective and minimally intrusive,26
But I am not betting on a broad victory for EPIC because, once again, the 
Court seems to follow social norms when it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment.  It recently struck down strip searches of a high school girl, 
8-to-1, because there was a national outcry against searching young girls in 
high school for drugs on very low degrees of suspicion.
 and by those standards, you could well 
say that the naked machines fail both tests. 
27
I do think, though, that the tentative victory of the blob machines over the 
naked machines provides a model for other successful attempts to balance 
privacy and security.  A mobilized public can pressure the government into 
striking a reasonable balance when the privacy costs of a particular 
technology are dramatic, visible, and widely distributed.  And people have 
to experience the invasions personally, as a kind of loss of control over the 
conditions of their own exposure.  There is something about the fact that all 
travelers experienced this invasion so viscerally that made the protests 
ultimately successful. 
  But the public 
outcry against the naked machines, although significant, still represents the 
views of a mobilized minority. 
Can citizens mobilize to demand a similarly reasonable balance when the 
threats to privacy come not from government, but from private 
corporations, like Google and Facebook, and when the parties responsible 
for exposing too much personal information are not the government, but 
ourselves?  Here I am less confident.  When it comes to invasions of 
privacy by fellow citizens rather than by the government, we are in the 
realm not of autonomy, but of a different value of privacy—namely, 
dignity.  Remember that autonomy preserves a sphere of immunity from 
government intrusion into our lives.  Dignity, by contrast, protects the 
norms of social respect that we accord to each other.  Dignity is a socially 
constructed value.  It varies tremendously by country and by society and by 
epoch.  In Germany, it is considered a violation of dignity and law to give 
someone the finger on the highway.  It is an offense against honor.  Imagine 
how citizens in California would fare under a regime like that.  By contrast, 
the French are much more concerned than Americans about being asked 
about their salaries. 
It is foolish to generalize about international norms when it comes to 
dignity because they vary so much.  But precisely because dignity is a 
socially constructed value, it is very difficult to preserve by judges or by 
private corporations in the face of the express preferences of citizens who 
are in fact less concerned about dignity than exposure. 
 
 26. United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 27. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
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That leads to my second example, the drunken Facebook picture and the 
right to be forgotten.  We are all familiar by now of the perils of posting ill-
advised photos, chats, and status updates on the Web that can come back to 
haunt us.  The paradigmatic example is Stacy Snyder, the young teacher-in-
training in Pennsylvania,28 who made the mistake of posting on her 
MySpace page a picture of herself carrying a plastic cup, wearing a pirate’s 
hat, and posting the caption “Drunken Pirate.”  Her employer, the public 
high school where she taught, decided that she was promoting underage 
drinking and fired her as a result.29  Her university, the day before her 
graduation, denied her a teaching degree.30
She sued, arguing that her First Amendment rights had been violated, and 
a judge rejected the claim on the grounds that because she was a public 
employee, her speech was not a matter of public concern, and therefore was 
not protected by the First Amendment.
 
31
In America, it is hard to formulate a legal remedy for the injury that 
Stacy Snyder suffered:  an inability to escape her internet past.  In 1890, in 
the most famous article on the right to privacy ever written, Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis warned that because of new technologies like the 
Kodak camera and the tabloid press, gossip is no longer the resource of the 
idle and the vicious, but has now become a trade.
  As a result, Snyder never became 
a teacher.  She is now working in human resources.  Her career was derailed 
because of this one unfortunate picture. 
32
Although the volume of gossip on the internet today is vastly greater than 
the gossip of the Gilded Age tabloids that worried Brandeis, the threatened 
injury is the same:  dignity.  Brandeis, of course, struggled to articulate the 
value, because American law, as he recognized, has no vocabulary of 
protecting dignity.  Unlike Roman law, said Brandeis, we do not make 
cognizable offenses against honor.
 
33  Instead, Brandeis tried to propose a 
whole new series of torts, which sound like a delicious dessert but are 
actually a frustrating series of civil causes of action to regulate offenses 
against dignity.  Because of a lack of social consensus about how much 
privacy is reasonable to expect, those torts have failed to gain adherents in 
the U.S., despite finding support elsewhere; according to one law review 
article, the Brandeis torts are “alive and well” and living in France.34
 
 28. See Brett Lovelace, Web Photo Haunts Graduate; MU Sued for Denying Degree, 
INTELLIGENCER J., Apr. 27, 2007, at A1. 
  That 
is just about the only place where you can still sue photographers for taking 
pictures of celebrities. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *14–16 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 3, 2008). 
 32. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 195–96 (“Gossip is no longer the resource 
of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well 
as effrontery.”). 
 33. Id. at 198. 
 34. Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France:  The Warren & Brandeis Tort 
Is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219 (1994). 
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In Europe, efforts to create legal remedies for the indignity of being 
tethered to your past on the internet are far more ambitious.  An early 
proposal came from Alex Türk, the French data privacy commissioner, who 
endorsed the creation of a “right to oblivion.”35
More recently, Viviane Reding, the EU Commissioner of Justice and 
Vice President of the European Commission, proposed to codify the “right 
to be forgotten.”  In a speech at the Second Annual Data Protection 
Conference in Brussels in December 2011, she declared: 
  You know this is coming 
from France.  It is straight out of Sartre.  Americans want to be famous 
while the French want to be forgotten.  How exactly this was supposed to 
be administered is not clear.  Türk proposed creating some kind of 
international body, perhaps an “international commission of forgetfulness,” 
which would evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not a particular 
request to take down a particular picture should be granted as an offense 
against the dignitary or moral rights of the offended individual.  But the 
details remain murky. 
I also want to establish the famous right to be forgotten, which will build 
on existing rules to better cope with privacy risks online.  I believe this 
right is very important in a world of increased connectivity and the 
unlimited search and storage.  If users no longer want their data to be 
stored, and if there is no good reason to keep it online anymore, the data 
should be removed.36
If the right to be forgotten is nothing more ambitious than a right to 
demand deletion of personally identifiable stored data after a period of time, 
then it would clarify (and provide an enforcement mechanism) for a 
principle of “data economy” already implicit in the European privacy 
directive.
 
37
As proposed, however, the right to be forgotten seems to create a legal 
entitlement for people to remove photos they have posted voluntarily, even 
after those photos have been widely shared.
 
38  In this sense, it clashes 
dramatically with American notions of free expression.  We have examples 
of this broader conception of the right to be forgotten in a recent decision 
from Argentina, which dramatically expanded the liability of search engines 
like Google and Yahoo for offensive photographs.39
 
 35. See Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at MM30. 
  Last year, an 
Argentine judge held that Google and Yahoo were liable for moral harm 
 36. See Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the Eur. Comm’n, Speech at the Second 
Annual European Data Protection and Privacy Conference, The Future of Data Protection 
and Transatlantic Cooperation (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/851&format=HTML&aged=0&language=E
N&guiLanguage=en. 
 37. Axel Spies, Analysis:  Reform of the EU Data Protection Directive:  ‘Right to Be 
Forgotten’—What Should Be Forgotten and How?, GLOBAL L. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://www.globallawwatch.com/2011/12/analysis-reform-of-the-eu-data-protection-
directive-right-to-be-forgotten-what-should-be-forgotten-and-how/. 
38. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten. 
 39. See Vinod Sreeharsha, Google and Yahoo Win Appeal in Argentine Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at B4. 
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and violating the privacy of Virginia da Cunha—a pop star who unwisely 
posed for some racy pictures, which got posted on the internet, and thought 
the better of it.40  These were not pornographic or obscene, and they were 
voluntarily posted.41
The potentials for abuse of this right to be forgotten are obvious.  Pop 
stars who take racy pictures often have a habit of running for political 
office, especially in Italy.  You could well imagine a candidate on the 
campaign trail, thinking better of those youthful pictures and trying to 
remove all references to herself in order to protect herself from 
embarrassment. 
  But she changed her mind.  She said, in effect, “My 
dignitary rights are violated.  Take down the pictures.”  The Argentine 
judge agreed and ordered Google and Yahoo to take the pictures down.  
Essentially, Yahoo’s response was, “Technologically, it is so hard for us to 
do this.  We cannot selectively just remove these pictures, which have been 
widely shared.  Instead, we are going to have to remove all references to 
this person entirely.”  When Argentinian users plug da Cunha into Yahoo 
today, they see a blank page and a judicial order.  
Enforcement is also difficult.  Against whom is the right of action?  Just 
Google and Yahoo?  Against faithless friends who share the photographs?  
Under what circumstances should photographs be left up in the public 
interest?  Do we want a “commission of forgetfulness” to be making case-
by-case determinations of what is in the public’s interest to demand? 
As Peter Fleischer, the Global Privacy Counsel at Google, has noted, the 
right to be forgotten is a sweeping concept that can include a series of very 
different claims.42  The least controversial is the right to delete something I 
post online on my own Facebook page or album—a service that most 
platforms already provide.  But the right to delete becomes more 
controversial if I post something and someone else copies it onto another 
site—as in the case of the widely circulated photos of the Argentinian pop 
star.  Surely, Fleischer suggests, internet platforms should not be asked to 
delete pictures of me from someone else’s album without the owner’s 
consent.43  Even more difficult, he notes, is the question whether I should 
have the right to delete truthful but embarrassing information that someone 
else posts about me—a request that squarely pits values of privacy against 
free speech.44  And the question how to enforce different national 
judgments makes the problem still harder, as Fleischer notes:  if a German 
court decides that German murderers should be able to delete evidence of 
their conviction after a specified time has passed, should that deletion apply 
only in Germany or across the globe, and who should enforce it?45
 
 40. Id. 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking About Right to Oblivion, PETER FLEISCHER:  
PRIVACY . . . ? (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:59 AM), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-
thinking-about-right-to-oblivion.html. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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Given the complexity of asking courts to balance clashing values of free 
speech and privacy in a world where there is no agreement about what 
privacy demands, my instinct is that technological solutions here are more 
promising than legal ones.  There is, for example, a blob machine-like 
solution to the Stacy Snyder problem—namely, disappearing data.  There 
are already small-scale apps that allow your data to disappear.  There is one 
called TigerText that allows you to put expiration dates on your text 
messages.46
More recently, a German company called X-Pire
  They can disappear in three days or three months, as the user 
specifies. 
47 announced the launch 
of a Facebook app that will allow users automatically to erase designated 
photos using electronic keys that expire after short periods of time, obtained 
by solving a CAPTCHA, one of those graphics that are impossible to read 
where you have to type in fixed-number combinations.  The application 
ensures that once the timestamp on the photo has expired, the key 
disappears.  X-Pire is a model for sensible blob machine-like solutions to 
the problem of digital forgetting.  But unless Facebook builds X-Pire-like 
apps into its platform—in a sense, making it a default option that people 
can easily access—the chance of citizens opting in on a broad scale seem 
low, and therefore disappearing data will not, in practice, become a norm.  
And unfortunately, here is a case where Facebook’s financial interests clash 
dramatically with the blob machine-like solution that could protect privacy.  
Facebook has been moving in the opposite direction, toward transparency 
rather than privacy.  In defending Facebook’s decision to make the default 
for profile information public rather than private, Mark Zuckerberg said that 
Facebook had an obligation to reflect current social norms that favor 
exposure over privacy.48
That seems like precisely the wrong approach to this complicated 
problem.  As we saw in the case of the blob machine and Google 24/7 
surveillance, social norms are not something that Facebook reflects.  On the 
contrary, Google and Facebook have a crucial role in shaping those social 
norms.  The decision to architect X-Pire-like technologies—to make it easy 
to delete data you have posted on your own site—will itself have a more 
dramatic impact on the scope of the right to oblivion than any series of 
decisions made by international courts and regulatory bodies.  This 
confirms, once again, the difficulty of imposing contested social norms on a 
fractious globe. 
 
 
 46. See Belinda Luscombe, TigerText:  An iPhone App for Cheating Spouses?, TIME 
(Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1968233,00.html. 
 47. See X-PIRE, http://www.x-pire.de/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
 48. See Marshall Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy Is Over, 
READWRITEWEB (Jan. 9, 2010, 9:25 PM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/
facebooks_zuckerberg_says_the_age_of_privacy_is_ov.php (quoting Zuckerberg as saying, 
"We view it as our role in the system to constantly be innovating and be updating what our 
system is to reflect what the current social norms are.”). See generally Jose Antonio Vargas, 
The Face of Facebook:  Mark Zuckerberg Opens Up, NEW YORKER, Sept. 20 2010, at 54, 
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My final example has to do with free speech and takes us to the case of 
Google.  I have argued so far that courts may be better equipped to regulate 
offenses against autonomy by 24/7 surveillance and Facebook than offenses 
against dignity, such as drunken Facebook pictures that never go away.  But 
the regulation in both cases will turn on evolving social norms whose 
contours in twenty years, let alone five years, are hard to predict. 
Until recently, the person who had more power to determine who may 
speak and who may be heard around the world was not a president or king 
or Supreme Court Justice.  She was Nicole Wong, who was deputy general 
counsel at Google until her recent resignation.  Her colleagues called her 
“the Decider.”49  Nicole Wong was the Decider, who was awoken in the 
middle of the night to decide what content goes up or comes down, not only 
on Google.com, not only on each of the national Googles that are operated 
around the world, such as Google.fr, Google.de, but also what goes up or 
comes down on YouTube, which Google bought in 2006.50
You might be uncomfortable with the idea of allowing a single woman, a 
Decider, to make these incredibly contextual and difficult free speech 
decisions for the globe, but the truth is that this Decider model, as 
inadequate as it may be, may be better than the alternatives.  At the 
moment, there is tremendous pressure from repressive countries around the 
world, and from Western democracies, for network-wide blocking of 
videos.  Comcast and Verizon are pressured to block child pornography at 
the internet level.  In Europe, there are growing demands for network-wide 
blocking of terrorist incitement videos.  
 
As Evgeny Morozov demonstrates in his compelling new book, The Net 
Delusion, repressive governments such as Iran and even Egypt can use the 
internet to constrict freedom rather than to expand it.51
Wong deserves the respect of libertarian conservatives and civil 
libertarian liberals, for she was essentially codifying, as a matter of policy, 
the firm protection for speech that the Supreme Court recognized in the 
1969 Brandenburg v. Ohio case.
  Contrary to the 
meliorism of cyber-utopians, the revolution will not, Morozov argues, be 
tweeted. 
52  But unfortunately, Wong and her 
colleagues recently retreated from that bright line under further pressure 
from Senator Joe Lieberman.  Recently, YouTube added a new category 
that viewers can click to flag videos for removal:  “promoting terrorism.”53
 
 49. Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at MM50. 
  
This is troubling, because it sweeps more broadly than the Supreme Court 
standard for regulating speech that incites violence, and YouTube’s 
capitulation to Lieberman shows that a user-generated system for enforcing 
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community standards will never protect speech as scrupulously as unelected 
judges enforcing strict rules about when speech can be viewed as a form of 
dangerous conduct. 
Google remains a better guardian for free speech than internet companies 
like Facebook, which has refused to join the Global Network Initiative, an 
industry-wide coalition committed to upholding free speech and privacy.54  
The critic Lee Siegel suggests that in fifty years we may look back on 
Google as we now do on the East India Company, and if so, it may be with 
nostalgia for a Decider model that, for all its flaws, protected speech better 
than the available alternatives.55
But the capitulation of YouTube shows that Google’s “trust us” model 
may not be a stable way of protecting free speech in the twenty-first 
century, even though the alternatives to trusting Google—authorizing 
national regulatory bodies around the globe to request the removal of 
controversial videos—might protect less speech than Google’s Decider 
model currently does.  And of course, whether the Decider model can 
survive the relentless commercial pressures to monetize journalism, so that 
the most prominently displayed stories and videos are the ones most likely 
to provide effective platforms for selling ads to targeted users, remains to be 
seen. 
 
So let me sum up.  I have tried to stress the complexity of protecting 
constitutional values like privacy and free speech in the age of Google and 
Facebook, entities which are not formally constrained by the Constitution.  
On the one hand, I am trying to offer an optimistic story in each of my 
examples—24/7 Google surveillance, blob machines, escaping your 
Facebook past, and promoting free speech on YouTube and Google.  In 
each of these cases, it is possible to imagine a rule or technology that would 
protect values like free speech and privacy in a changing world.  We can 
imagine a constitutional prohibition on ubiquitous surveillance, a preference 
for blob machines over naked machines, an expansion of disappearing data 
technologies, and an enlightened leadership at companies like Google and 
Twitter that protects free speech rather than suppressing it.   
But whether these good rules or technologies will in fact be adopted 
depends crucially on what sort of rules and technologies the public 
demands.  The majority opinion in the Jones case ultimately ruled against 
GPS surveillance narrowly rather than broadly, in part because of a 
reluctance to create amorphous new rights of personal autonomy such as the 
one recognized in Roe v. Wade.  It took political protests—the “Don’t touch 
my junk” movement—to persuade the Obama Administration to turn its 
naked machines into blob machines.  Facebook has reluctantly made it 
easier to delete data in the face of user demand (and legal threats from 
Europe), although it is still betting that the demand for privacy will be 
outweighed by the demand for exposure.  And Google, despite its 
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commitment to free expression, chose not to resist political demands to 
expand its categories of prohibited speech on YouTube.  Those categories, 
of course, are ultimately enforced by users and therefore reflect community 
standards rather than resisting them. 
Will citizens around the globe demand laws and technology that protect 
liberty rather than threatening it?  The choice is ours. 
 
